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There are a variety of United States Statutes that impact
the contracting officer during the acquisition of requirements
from foreign sources. Some of these statutes have provisions
for making a determination for their waiver, for others no
waiver is possible without Congressional action. The U. S. has
entered the world weapons market on an increasing scale in the
past few years as a result based, in part, on the new emphasis
on NATO cooperation. International considerations are impor-
tant aspects to be evaluated during the acquisition cycle.
Existing international programs have experienced a reluctance
by foreign countries and firms to utilize U. S. imposed con-
tracting procedures by the country or firm in their domestic
environment, procedures that frequently differ from what is
considered normal or standard for the particular country or
firm. This thesis addresses the U. S. regulations that have
proved to be difficult to impose on foreign governments and
contractors and analyzed the alternatives available to the
contracting officer; waivers and alternative procedures that
provide the same level of confidence as the original statute.
The thesis concludes by offering some recommendations to im-
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It has been stated that each government has the obligation
and right to insure the physical safety of its citizens, and
each government has the duty to preserve the nation's ability
to pursue legitimate interests in the international environment
United States foreign policy seeks as a minimum the goals of
security and freedom for its citizens and for its allies.
A direct link exists between this nation's foreign policy
and its military forces. The military exists to undergird our
foreign policy, to assist it in peacefully attaining our na-
tional security objectives.
A new facet of United States foreign policy was brought
forth by President Carter in May, 1977, during remarks made
at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's (NATO) ministerial
meeting. The common goals of the European and North American
members of the Alliance were recognized and reinforced.
The President stated in part [1:6] :
The collective deterrent strength of our Alliance is
effective. But it will only remain so if we work to
improve it. The United States is prepared to make a
major effort to this end,... in the expectation that
our Allies will do the same.
There have been real increases in allied defense spend-
ing. But difficult economic conditions set practical
limits. We need to use limited resources wisely, par-
ticularly in strengthening conventional forces. To this
end: We must combine, coordinate and concert our
national programs more effectively... .
This statement brought into sharp focus the policy of
attempting to realize more effective and economical military
7

alliance by improving cooperation in development, production
and procurement of Alliance defense equipment. In support of
this policy, both the Congress and the Department of Defense
(DOD) have passed legislation and have made policy statements
to implement the goals of cooperative weapons development in
the acquisition process.
In this relatively na»? policy environment, a solidification
process is taking place. There is not full agreement on the
benefits to be gained from this policy, or how the new policy
will meld in and dovetail with previously existing policies.
Different interpretations exist on how the cooperative weapons
development policies will be implemented. DOD and its service
departments are on the cutting edge of implementing the policy
while many different hands are on the knife trying to determine
and direct the proper surgical technique.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
The U. S. currently has many policies and programs that
are implemented through the acquisition process. Not all of
these programs have the same goals, and at times some program
goals tend to conflict. The area of cooperative weapons develop-
ment is an example where conflict has developed between the new
policy and previously existing ones. These policies all have
some basis in law, some enacting legislation that gave birth
to a program, and frequently subsequent legislation further
refining the policy.
It is this area of where legislation enacted for one pur-
pose conflicts with the goals of another that provides the
8

basis for the research question of this study: What is the
impact of the United States' acquisition regulations (which are
based on laws and statutes) on cooperative weapons acquisition?
Further, what are some of the difficulties attendant with per-
forming the contracting process to meet current policy goals
in our present legal and statutory system?
C. OBJECTIVE
The objective, therefore, is to identify the various laws,
statutes, regulations and policies that define the current
policy environment of cooperative weapons development and de-
termine the impact on the acquisition process from the point
of view of the Procuring Contracting Officer (PCO)
.
D. SCOPE
The thrust of the research is directed at defining the ac-
quisition arena within which the PCO finds himself. It is in-
tended to analyze the principal problems brought about by the
emphasis on international considerations during the weapon
system acquisition process and further to analyze how the prob-
lems are overcome to acquire the desired goods and services
and meet the variety of goals required in the Federal Govern-
ment's procurement process.
E. ASSUMPTIONS
It is assumed that the reader has a basic familiarity with
the Defense Acquisitions Regulation, the Defense System Acquis-
ition Review Counsel (DSARC) process and the Major Systems
acquisition process as embodied in the Office of Management and





This research was based on two primary methods: literature
search and personal interviews. The literature search began
with a review of articles published in DOD journals and reports
and research sponsored by various DOD agencies. It also in-
cludes considerable testimony and subsequent reports before
both Houses of Congress and their various sub-committees.
Although there are studies and reports which now identify
the various statutes that impact the international acquisition
process, a very limited amount of information is available re-
lating how the requirements of the statutes are translated into
a multi-national meeting of the minds and subsequent contract.
The logical source for this type of information is from
personnel currently engaged in international programs. Inter-
views were conducted with various involved Government personnel,
with Navy personnel being the primary source.
G. ORGANIZATION
This thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter II deals
with legal statutes and regulations that comprise the frame-
work of international contracting. Chapter III gives a histor-
ical perspective to provide a background of the current inter-
national acquisition arena. Chapter IV analyzes the issues
and problems that are currently experienced with Chapter V re-
viewing how these problems have been dealt with on specific
programs. Finally, Chapter VI integrates the problems and





There is more than one basis for the procedures utilized
in placing contracts for military goods and services. The pri-
mary basis is found in Acts of Congress codified under general
topics in the United States Code. The laws relating to the armed
forces are generally found in Title 10 of the Code, although
numerous Acts that apply to the procurement procedure may be
uncodified such as appropriation acts or legislation too re-
cent to have been published in the Code.
The implementing procurement regulations are contained in
a collection of formally published regulations known as the De-
fense Acquisition Regulation. These regulations are issued un-
der statutory authority and have the force and effect of law.
With a new commitment toward a policy of cooperation in
the development, production and procurement of defense equip-
ment, DOD has found that differences in the contracting practices
and procedures of the various governments have made inter-
allied procurement difficult to achieve.
Two general areas of difference between American and
foreign practices have made it difficult to accomplish multi-
national procurement goals.
The first general area is the statutory requirement in
American law that Government contracts be awarded after the
maximum degree of competition is obtained; although there are
at least some nations where there is a policy of favoring
11

competition, the legal difference, nevertheless, appears to
have significance. [2:4]
The other general subject area is in the use of "boiler
plate" clauses, contract clauses required by law which embody
some social or economic policy. One of the policies, for
example, favors U. S. shipping firms over foreign firms;
another provides for examination of thecontractor 's records
by the Comptroller General,
Since under the new policy, equipment is procured not only
for American forces but also for foreign nations, the argument
can be made that these statutory policies should be extended
to foreign procurements as well,
B. FORMAL ADVERTISING
From- a procedural standpoint, American statutes prescribe
that the award of a contract will be accomplished, to the max-
imum practical extent, on a formally advertised competitive
basis to the lowest responsive and responsible bidder. This
predisposition has a very long history in American jurisprudence,
As one commentator described it in 1809 [3:7]:
...there was enacted the first of a long series of laws,.,
imposing a general requirement for the use of formal
advertising in the procurement of supplies and services.
That statute provided that all purchases and contracts by
the Secretaries of the Treasury, War and Navy would be
made 'either by purchase or by previously advertising
for proposals respecting the same.
'
The following are some of the fundamental requirements of
United States law relating to this procedural preference [4:
1581] :
TITLE SUBSTANCE





provision of sec. 823,
P.L. 95-111
Formal Advertising Awards
10 U.S.C. , sec. 2305(c)
Maximum Competition
10 U.S.C. , sec. 2304 (g) ,
as amended
be used except that, so far
as practicable, all contracts
shall be awarded on a fojnnally
advertised competitive bid
basis to the lowest responsi-
ble bidder.
In advertised procurement,
award shall be made to the
responsible bidder where bid
conforms to the invitation
and will be the most advan-
tageous to the United States,
price and other factors con-
sidered.
In all negotiated procure-
ments in excess of $10,000 in
which rates or prices are not
fixed by law or regulation and
in which time of delivery will
permit, proposals, including
price, shall be solicited from
the maximum number of qualified
sources consistent with the na-
ture and requirements of the
supplies or services to be pro-
cured. Except in stated cir-
cumstances, requires written
or oral discussions be held
with all offerors within
competitive range.
Contracts for property and ser-
vices shall be made by formal
advertising to the extent feasi-
ble and practicable except that
negotiation is allowed in 17
stated situations. Section
2304(a) (1) which authorizes the
negotiation of contracts "when
determined in the public inter-
est during a national emergency
declared by the Congress or the
President" is used as authority
to make partial set-asides for
labor distressed areas. The
national emergency declared by
the President on December 16,
1950, is still in effect.
There are numerous exceptions to the general rule of formal




10 U.S.C. , sec. 2304 (a)

of modern armaments means that in dollar terms the vast majority
of military procurements are not formally advertised. Never-
theless, the concept remains a fundamental principle of Govern-
ment contract law.
In other countries, the legal situation is vastly different.
This researcher will not provide a detailed analysis of the dif-
ferences, but reference to general descriptions of some of the
various systems will be noted.
One recent article emphasizes in dramatic terms the absence
in the British system not only of legal requirements for formal
advertising, but also of those statutory mandates or guidelines
relating to such areas as small business and domestic industry
which are a characteristic of the American system [5:86]:
One of the most striking things in British government
contracting practice is the absence of elaborate statutes
governing the procurement process. ... The British govern-
ment has no general procurement act, such as the Armed
Services Procurement Act or Title III, Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act. There is no statute re-
quiring that public contracts be made by competitive ad-
vertising. As a matter of policy, the British government
engages in as much competitive advertising as it can be-
cause it believes that this is the soundest way to get the
most reasonable price. ... A further striking difference
to the American observer is the relative absence of sta-
tutes which declare public policies applicable to govern-
ment contracts. For example, in the United States we have the
Buy-American Act, Walsh-Healey Public Contracts Act, and
others, which express social, labor, or economic policies af-
fecting government contracts. The British government has
practically none of this, although contracts are subject to
a 'fair wages' resolution made by Parliament in 194 6.
As the foregoing indicates, British public contracts are
generally awarded after the Government obtains as much competi-
tion as it deems feasible, but obtaining such competition is not
a legal requirement in the American sense of the term. Therefore,
although procurement in the United Kingdom is not subject to a
14

statutory requirement of formal advertising, there is a con-
siderable effort to obtain competition in that system.
This is substantially less true in other countries. A re-
cent study of the Italian economy, for example, discussed at
some length the increasing importance of the "state holding
groups," which are in effect corporations of mixed public and
private ownership. They are very deeply involved in such impor-
tant industries as steel, heavy engineering and shipbuilding
[6:217] .
The oldest and most comprehensive of the restrictive sta-
tutes that specifically favors American products is the Buy-
American Act, 41 U.S.C. lOa-lOd [2:9]:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and unless
the head of the department or independent establishment
concerned shall determine it to be inconsistent with the
public interest, or the cost to be unreasonable, only such
unmanufactured articles, materials, and supplies as have
been manufactured in the United States substantially all
from articles, materials or supplies mined, produced, or
manufactured, as the case may be, in the United States,
shall be acquired for public use. This section shall not
apply with respect to articles, materials, or supplies
from which they are manufactured are not mined,
produced, or manufactured, as the case may be, in the
United States in sufficient and reasonable available com-
mercial quantities and of a satisfactory quality.
C. "BOILER PLATE"
Reference has been made to the use of so-called "boiler
plate" clauses—clauses which are required by law to be in-
serted in procurement contracts in order to carry out some social
or economic policy.
While some of the policies reflected in DOD contracts could
probably be universally approved, various countries have evi-
denced a reluctance to include some basic contract provisions
that are mandatory in United States contracts.
15

The following are some of the "boiler plate" requirements
considered unique to the United States law which are most fre-




10 U.S.C. , sec. 2207
Covenant Against Con-
tingent Fees
10 U.S.C. , sec. 2306(b)
Officials Not to Benefit
41 U.S.C. , sec. 22 and
18 U.S.C. , sec. 431
Examination of Records
10 U.S.C, sec. 2313 (b)
Cost Accounting Standards
Section 710 of the Defense
Production Act of 1950, as
amended, 50 U.S.C. App.
2168
Requires contract clause pro-
viding for termination of
contract and other penalties
in the event gratuities were
offered or given to any officer
or employee of the Government
with a view toward securing
favors in regard to Govern-
ment contracts.
Contractor must warrant in
contract that no person or sell-
ing agency has been employed or
retained to solicit or obtain
such contract for a commission
or contingent fee, excepting
bona fide employees or selling
agencies of contractor.
Requires clause in every agree-
ment or contract entered into
by or on behalf of the United
States that no member of Con-
gress may share in or receive
any benefits from the Govern-
ment contract.
Every contract negotiated under
this Act shall provide for exam-
ination by GAO of records of the
contractor and his subcontrac-
tors for 3 years following final
payment under the contract. Sta-
tute provides for exception to
be made for a foreign contrac-
tor or subcontractor based on a
determination made in accordance
with this section.
Certain negotiated defense con-
tracts and subcontracts in ex-
cess of $100,000 are required
to contain a clause providing
for disclosure and adherence to
disclosed costs accounting prac-




Submission of Cost and
Pricing Data
10 U.S.C. , sec. 2306(f)
Advance Payments
10 U.S.C. , sec. 2307
Vinson-Trammel Act
10 U.S.C. , sec. 2383;
10 U.S.C. , sec. 7300
by the Cost Accounting Stan-
dards Board. These standards
cover not only matters such as
consistence in estimating,
accumulating and reporting, cost^
consistency in allocating costs
incurred for the same purpose,
but also matters such as capi-
talization of tangible assets,
accounting for costs of compen-
sated personal absence, and
allocation of business unit
general and administrative
expenses.
Prime and subcontractors shall
be required to submit accurate,
complete and current cost or
pricing data and certify thereto
in all non-competitive contracts
over $100,000 unless prices are
set by law or regulation, are
catalog prices of commercial
items with substantial public
sales, or requirement is waived
by head of agency. For purpose
of assuring compliance with pro-
visions of section 2306(f) re-
quiring submission of accurate,
complete and current cost data
and certification thereof, agency
may examine books of contractor
or subcontractor relating to
negotiation, pricing or perfor-
mance of the contract or subcon-
tract until three years after
final payment.
Advance payments may be made only
upon adequate security and if the
agency determines in writing that
such payments are in the public
interest. Advance payments over
$25 million not provided for in
original terms of a contract must
be notified to the Congress.
With certain exceptions any con-
tract or subcontract thereunder
over $10,000 for construction of
aircraft or naval vessels, or any
portion thereof, shall contain
clause making applicable the pro-
visions of the Vinson-Trammel Act
regarding excess profits. The
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Vinson-Trammel Act is currently
in effect by virtue of the ex-
piration of the Renegotiation
Act of 1951.
D. APPROPRIATION RESTRICTIONS
Other provisions of U. S. law contained in the annual DOD
Appropriation Authorization and Appropriation Acts restrict the
availability of funds for acquisition of foreign source supplies
and services. In addition, they prescribe unique limitations on












Section 707 of P.L. 93-365
(also sec. 604 of the
Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, 22 U.S.C., 2354 and
sec. 42 of the Foreign




of appropriations for procure-
ment of articles of food, cloth-
ing, cotton, woven silk and
woven silk blends, spun silk
yarn for cartridge cloth, syn-
thetic fabric, specialty metals,
or wool not grown, reprocessed,
reused or produced in the United
States. Exception made in the
case of specialty metals where
procurement is in furtherance
of standardization and inter-
operability of equipment within
NATO.
No R&D contract in connection
with a weapon system may be made
with a foreign source where there
exists a United States source e-
qually competent and willing to
perform at a lower cost.
No funds appropriated to the DOD
may be used to buy other than
United States manufactured items
unless adequate consideration has
been given to the United States
fiinns, labor surplus areas. United
States small business, the United
States balance of payments, and
certain costs associated with buy-
ing foreign; unless otherwise per-
mitted under the Buy-American Act.
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IR and D Costs and Bid and
Proposal Costs
Section 203 of P.L.
10 U.S.C., 2358 ft.
94-441;
nt.
Naval Construction Appropriated funds may not be
Limitations used for the construction of
Annual DOD Appropriation major components of a Navy
Acts under Shipbuilding and vessel in a foreign shipyard.
Conversion, Navy Appropriated funds shall not be
used for the construction of any
Navy vessel in a foreign ship-
yard.
Limits the availability of funds
authorized for appropriation to
the DOD under that Act or provi-
sions of any other Act for pay-
ment of independent research and
development of bid and proposal
costs under contracts subject to
the submission and certification
of cost or pricing data under 10
U.S.C., 2306(f) unless the work
has a potential relationship to
a military function or operation
and, in stated circumstances, an
advance agreement on these costs
is obtained from contractor.
No funds appropriated by this Act
shall be available for paying the
costs of advertising other than
out of profits by any defense con-
tractor, except for recruitment,
procurement of scarce items, or
disposal of scrap or surplus
materials.
Inclusion of these requirements in foreign contracts has of-
ten been difficult; largely, one might assume, because the inser-
tion of "boiler plate" clauses is not a familiar process in most
countries [2:5]
.
Whatever the reasons, foreign contractors have been reluctant
or unwilling to include such clauses in their contracts.
Some of these requirements, like the restrictions on appro-
priations, explicitly limit DOD's authority to make procurements
abroad. Others, like the requirement for observing Cost Account-
ing Standards, merely impose onerous bookkeeping procedures.
Advertising
DOD Authorization Acts;




still others, like the prohibition against gratuities, may be
regarded as virtually unenforceable in certain foreign contexts.
Research has indicated that foreign contractors, in addition
to raising specific problems with specific clauses, have a more
generalized objection to the inclusion of the "boiler plate"





The Department of Defense has experienced a new era in ac-
quisition policy to meet growing international defense programs.
These programs had their genesis in the period following World
war II with U. S. Grant Aid and Foreign Military Aid. The most
recent program efforts center around NATO Rationalization, Stan-
dardization and Interoperability (RSI) , a more cooperative ef-
fort with foreign nations sharing in weapons contracts.
In the 1970 's the monopolistic control by the U. S. arm's
industry in the military hardware market began to diminish. For-
eign countries began to develop their own capabilities to pro-
duce military hardware. Our Allies, especially the NATO coun-
tries, began demanding a share of the weapons development market.
With the high costs associated with developing and produc-
ing a new weapon system, there is a potential for more effective
utilization of resources through cooperative international ac-
quisition programs. Congress reflected its view in the "Culver- -g^*""^
Nunn" Amendment to the DOD Appropriation Act of 1977 by a state-
ment on cooperative weapon acquisition with out NATO Allies.
The Amendment states in part [7:10]:
It is the policy of the United States that equipment pro-
cured for the use of personnel of the Armed Forces of the
United States in Europe should be standardized or at
least interoperable with equipment of other members of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization.





The Secretary of Defense shall to the maximum feasible
extent initiate and carry out procurement procedures
that provide for the acquisition of equipment which is
standardized and interoperable.
This legislation also authorized the Secretary of Defense
to waive the "Buy-American" Act where he deemed it in the best
interest of the national defense in order to procure standard-
ized or interoperable equipment.
President Carter emphasized the cooperative policy in his
previously mentioned remarks to the NATO ministerial meeting
in May of 1977. He further defined the need when he stated
[1:6] :
As we strengthen our forces, we should also improve co-
operation in development, production and procurement of
alliance defense equipment. The alliance should not be
weakened militarily by waste and overlapping. Nor should
it be weakened politically by disputes over where to buy
defense equipment ... .We must make a major effort... to
eliminate waste and duplication between national programs;
to provide each of our countries an opportunity to develop,
produce and sell competitive defense equipment; and to
maintain technological excellence in allied combat forces.
The Department of Defense reinforced the President's mes-
sage by promulgating policy guidance in 1977 to include NATO
Rationalization, Standardization and Interoperability (RSI)
goals in new acquisitions.
The policy states, in part, that [8:1-2]:
(1) It is the policy of the United States that equip-
ment procured for U. S. forces stationed in Europe under
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be stand-
ardized or at least interoperable with equipment of other
members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
(2) The Department of Defense will actively seek standard-
ization and interoperability of weapon systems and equip-
ment within NATO on a priority basis in order to conserve
resources and increase the combined combat capability of
the U. S. and NATO forces.
22

(3) The DOD components will include NATO standardization
and interoperability goals as fundamental considerations
in their development and procurement programs for both
major and minor equipment items.
The directive offers some clarification of the terms "ra-
tionalization, " "Standardization" and "interoperability." It
provides the following [8:11]:
Rationalization . Any action that increases the effective-
ness of Alliance forces through more efficient or effective
use of defense resources committed to the Alliance. Ra-
tionalization includes consolidation, reassignment of na-
tional priorities to higher Alliance needs, standardiza-
tion, mutual support, improved interoperability or greater
cooperation. Rationalization applies to both weapons/
material resources and non-weapons military matters.
Standardization . The process by which member nations
achieve the closest practicable cooperation among forces;
the most efficient use of research, development, and pro-
duction resources; and agree to adopt on the broadest pos-
sible basis the use of: (1) common or compatible operational,
administrative, and logistics procedures; (2) common or
compatible technical procedures and criteria; (3) common,
compatible, or interchangeable supplies, components, wea-
pons, or equipment; and (4) common or compatible tactical
doctrine with corresponding organizational compatibility.
Interoperability . The ability of systems, units, or
forces to provide services to and accept services from
other systems, units, or forces and to use the services
so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively
together.
DOD has also incorporated RSI guidance in its cornerstone
directives on major system acquisition. The current draft
revision, 14 August 197 9, to DOD Directive 5000.1 and 5000.2
provides [9:3] :
NATO rationalization, standardization and interoperability
(RSI) is a basic consideration of systems having a partial
or total application to Europe.
That action shall be taken in the following areas [10:17]:
Consider NATO country participation throughout the
acquisition process.
Consider NATO doctrine and NATO member threat assess-
ments .. .mission needs of NATO members should be considered.
23

Consider all existing and developmental NATO member
systems that might address the mission need.
Develop plans for further international cooperation
in subsequent phases of the acquisition cycle (coopera-
tive development, co-production, subcontracting, etc.).
The essence of the policy efforts has been to insure that
DOD maintains a better liaison with its allies on armaments,
to consider allied solutions to U. S. military needs, and offer
allied countries suitable participation in U. S. programs.
Key to the implementation of the current RSI policy is the
use of the DSARC and the Decision Coordinating Paper. The
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Affairs and the Advisor to the Secretary of Defense on NATO
Affairs are now members of the DSARC for programs having RSI
implications and they review related Decision Coordinating Pa-
pers. For systems with a total or partial application to
NATO, RSI is a fundamental part of the acquisition strategy.
The Department of Defense has been involved in extensive
pronouncements in support of cooperative weapons programs.
Secretary of Defense Brown in his annual report to the Congress
regarding NATO RSI stated [11:3]:
The Department of Defense will vigorously pursue
greater compatibility of U.S. and Allied Forces to im-
prove their ability to operate effectively together
and, to the extent feasible, achieve more efficient
Alliance resource utilization. We will continue to
emphasize rationalization/standardization and inter-
operability including, as appropriate, increased pur-
chases or license of Allied equipment.
Dr. William J. Perry, Under Secretary of Defense, Research
and Engineering, in his statement to the Congress on the FY
1979 DOD Program for Research, Development and Acquisition
summarized DOD policy as [12:5658]:
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IWe intend to promote, to the maximum extent practical,
cooperative material programs with our Allies
—
particu-
larly NATO countries— in order to further our mutual
economic interests and common defense. Such cooperation
can improve the overall effectiveness of our forces and
simultaneously reduce cost through the employment of
commonality, standardization and other efficiencies.
The focus of international acquisition programs in DOD has ^'^^^
been the RSI effort with our NATO allies. To this end, DOD
submitted two pieces of legislation in the 95th Congress pro-
posing wide latitude for the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) in
granting waivers to statutory contract provisions for the pur-
pose of facilitating international cooperation.
One was designed to facilitate agreements with NATO coun-
tries for host nation support. The other proposed to expand
the SECDEF 's authority to enter into agreements with foreign
governments for the purchase of property or services.
Both proposals were heavily criticized by the Congress for
the excessive legal authority they would grant the Secretary of
Defense for the purchase of property and services. They would
empower the Secretary, "notwithstanding any other provisions
of law," [13:1162] to enter into standardization agreements or
enter into agreements for the purchase of property or services
and "waive the application of any provision of law prescribing
procedures to be followed in the formation of contracts...."
[13:1171]
.
Neither proposal survived the committee hearings because
of the Congressional concern that they went too far and because
of their unknown impact, although not easily quantifiable, as




Notwithstanding such criticism, DOD remains firmly com-
mitted to its international cooperative programs with NATO
RSI the primary thrust of current efforts.
B. DOD RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND INTEROPERABILITY
PROGRAMS
The Office of the Secretary of Defense has developed a
series of initiatives to carry out the mandated policy on
NATO cooperative armaments. These efforts have centered a-
round three areas: Mutual Defense Cooperation,. Family of
t^^'
Weapons, and Dual Production.
Mutual Defense Cooperation applies to agreements estab-
lished between two or more countries. These agreements, known
as Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) , have been developed to
set forth guiding principles governing cooperation between a
foreign country and the U.S. in research, development, pro-
duction, procurement and logistic support of conventional
defense equipment.
A specific MOU is usually developed to cover a unique pro-
gram. The content of a MOU may vary widely. Some are umbrella-
type agreements which give only general guidelines regarding
program objectives. Others are detailed, giving specific
criteria to be followed during program implementation.
The most salient feature of a MOU is the agreement between
the signing parties to evaluate offers or proposals without
applying price differentials under buy national laws and
regulations [13:44].
Often associated with the MOU's are Offset Programs. Off-





value of a primary sales agreement will be expended through
secondary sales to industries in the foreign country. Other
terms in connection with or often interchangeable with "offset"
include "two-way street" used by the Europeans and "quid pro
quo .
"
Because of the inherent difficulties in negotiating and
implementing compensatory offset agreements, and the potential
for economic inefficiencies, they often entail, DOD now enters
into such agreements only when there is no feasible alternative
to insure the successful completion of transactions considered
to be of significant importance to U. S. national security.
[14:589]
When such agreements are utilized, the following general
guidelines apply [14:589]:
(1) Agreements are to be as broad as possible.
(2) Specific offset targets are to be avoided.
(3) Agreements are to be used as vehicles for re-
ducing or waiving administrative barriers to
defense trade erected by all parties.
(4) Foreign firms bidding on contracts under the
terms of such agreements must do so actively
and compete on an equal basis with U. S. firms.
(5) Agreements involving specific arrangements
should specify that the burden for fulfilling
any commitment rests with the U.S. firms directly
benefiting from the sale.
The Family of Weapons concept is the most controversial of
the initiatives and is presently still in the exploratory stage.
It is an approach to arms cooperation which is designed to
eliminate competition between member nations by a process of
grouping "families" of weapons and then dividing up the work so
that no two nations would develop weapons for the same mission
area. 27

Conceptually, for example, one nation (or consortium of
nations)
,
would take the lead in developing a short-range ship-
to-ship missile while others would concentrate on long-range
ship-to-ship missiles.
No doubt this approach could reduce duplicative research
and development costs. However, national security issues are
being raised since a void would be experienced in organic tech-
nological studies for certain weapons systems; a country would
not have control to insure development is timely to meet its
particular needs and total development by others may not meet
the complete needs of the non-involved countries.
Based on these concerns and the results of the Special
Sub-Committee on NATO RSI and Readiness which found the concept
"still formless and undefined" [7:27], additional review of the
final form of this initiative is being conducted by the Office
of the Secretary of Defense.
Dual Production in the form of cooperative development and
cooperative production programs between the U.S. and NATO are
the most visible operating initiatives today. Weapon systems
such as the Roland missile, the F-16 aircraft, NATO Seasparrow
and Sidewinder missiles are categorized as dual production
efforts.
Such collaboration normally includes a sharing of tech-
nology and costs by the countries and companies involved. The
following types of activities are included under cooperative
development programs [15:8]:
a. Data exchange. Participating parties exchange tech-
nical and scientific information of mutual interest.
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b. Allocated development. Participants define an R and
D problem in terms of tasks, allocate responsibilities
for task accomplishment, complete tasks using national
resources and finally share the outcome.
c. Adaptive development. The U. S. obtains for evalua-
tion and possible adoption existing material which has
been or is being developed by other participants.
d. Interdependent development. This is akin to the
"family of weapons" concept. Participants agree on a
requirement but one participant goes it alone on the
development process.
e. Joint development. A shared responsibility is estab-
lished for funding and managerial or operational aspects
of the program.
f. Competitive R&D. This involves the independent de-
velopment of systems by two or more participants, with
a competition conducted for the best system. The result
is a standard system accepted by all the participants.
C. IMPACT ON THE ACQUISITION MANAGER
Every day the acquisition manager experiences a greater
involvement in a multi-national environment as a result of
these policies and the various programs designed to implement
the policy. Requirements determination must consider not just
U. S. but NATO systems and readiness needs as well as the po-
tential to meet the requirements from systems already developed
in a foreign country.
Both DOD and service acquisition review boards require such
an assessment be incorporated into every step of the acquisition
decision process. When the acquisition manager finds himself
in the international arena, a variety of new challenges are
faced.
These new challenges cover a broad spectrum and include
technology transfer, control of third country sales, currency
transactions and the problem of fluctuating currencies, foreign
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industry/government relationships, contract format, monitor-
ing acquisition progress, language delays, production problems
and overall awareness of their countries* ways of doing
business.
The emphasis of current policies and programs is closely
related to NATO cooperation. In all international acquisitions,
the contracting officer finds himself in a middle ground bearing
the brunt of the responsibility of translating U. S. laws, sta-
tutes, policies and programs into a workable agreement with a
foreign party.
The remainder of this thesis will be devoted to analyzing
specific problems the U. S. Government contracting officer ex-
periences within the existing legal and regulatory environment
to place a contract with a foreign party. The analysis will




IV. ANALYSIS OF THE ISSUES
A. GENERAL
As indicated in the previous chapters, the contracting
officer is confronted with a plethora of policies, programs
and statutory provisions that must be considered during the
international acquisition effort.
Not all of these policies, programs and statutory pro-
visions have the same objective and at times may seem to run
counter to each other. Statutes as laws of the land normally
take precedence where there is conflict between a program and
a statutory provision. Viewed another way, it may seem cer-
tain programs are incumbered by statutes that prevent their
efficient or effective implementation.
DOD's initial efforts to relieve the international ac-
quisition process of the statutory incumberances failed in
part due to the wide latitutde sought to waive any or all
conflicting statutes. Important to recognize is the fine
balance that exists between various U. S. policies, inter-
national NATO RSI being only one.
Congress was not going to allow the Department of Defense
to determine on a broad scope when international concerns would
take precedence over domestic ones . The balance must take in-
to account the preservation of the U.S. competitive procure-
ment process and the assurance of equitable treatment of
American industry and labor while trying to resolve disparities




It is apparent that for the current period, the contract-
ing officer must work within the existing statutory and regu-
latory environment.
B. CONTRACTING ENVIRONMENT
In a previous chapter the statutory environment for inter-
national acquisition was characterized. Some typical differ-
ences were noted between American and European practices which
tended to make it difficult to develop agreements and contracts
between the U. S. and foreign governments and foreign contrac-
tors. The U. S. statutes, and Defense Acquisition Regulation
(DAR) provide the general framework within which the contract-
ing officer must work.
The overall objective of this body of regulations is to:
(a) prohibit unethical business dealings; (b) provide support
for U. S. socio-economic welfare; (c) assure competition and
acquisition at the lowest price (all other factors considered);
(d) permit the validation of costs; and (e) protect certain
domestic industries.
As alluded to previously, the primary difficulties en-
countered in dealing with foreign parties have been a resent- ^A
ment by foreign nations of mandatory U.S. clauses which impinge
on a sovereign's integrity (e.g., officials not to benefit,
gratuities, and convenants against contingent fees) and clauses
which require examination of records, audits, and submittal of
costing data to support proposed foreign prices.
The contracting officer has two alternatives: (1) convince
the foreign party to accept the particular provision^) or (2)
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Ipursue waivers for the statutory and regulatory clauses
which have provisions for waiver.
The procedures for waiver of such clauses are by no means
perfunctory. Although certain of these provisions such as the
Buy American Act now have relatively liberal waiver possibi-
lities, others are not easily ignored or processed.
Review of the statutes which have been identified as ap-
plicable to international procurements provide the following
breakdown for which statutes are waivable and which are not:
WAIVABLE
10 U.S.C. 2306(f) Submittal of cost or pricing data
50 U.S.C. App. 2 618 Cost accounting standards
10 U.S.C. 2313 (c) Examination of records
41 U.S.C. lOa-lOd Buy American Act
NONWAIVABLE
41 U.S.C. 22 Officials not to benefit
10 U.S.C. 2207 Gratuities
10 U.S.C. 23 06(b) Covenants against contingent fees
10 U.S.C. 2382 Excess Profits Act
(Vinson-Trammell)
10 U.S.C. 23 04 Maximize advertised competition
P.L. 92-7 50 Foreign R&D source barred when
equally competent U.S. source at
lower cost
22 U.S.C. 2354 Restrictions on foreign procure-
ments in order to protect the U. S.
economy and industrial mobilization
base
Annual Appropriation Act Restrictions on construction of




This list is not all inclusive. Additional clauses have
created problems on specific procurement actions.
For example, the provision preventing use of convict labor,
18 U.S.C. 4082(c) (2), and the treatment of bid and proposal and
independent research and development costs, P.L. 91-441, both
of which are not waivable.
C . WAIVERS
Waiver procedures are outlined in the DAR for those pro-
visions which are waivable. The DAR specifies the criteria
under which a waiver, can be based and the level of authority
required to authorize the waiver. Specific procedures for the
waiver of DAR requirements for those waivable statutes mentioned
above are discussed below.
In situations where the clause requiring submittal of cost
or pricing data is not accepted, the contracting officer may
seek a waiver. In the case of a contract with a foreign govern-
ment or agency thereof, the Head of a Procuring Activity is
authorized to make a determination to waive the requirement. The
reasons for such a determination are required to be in writing
[16 :3-807 (3) (a) ] . In situations where foreign governments are
not involved, the Secretary may make such a determination.
For the Navy, the term "Secretary" means the Assistant
Secretary of the Navy for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logis-
tics (ASN(M,RASfL) ) . No further definitive guidance is provided
for the justification to be included in the determination. Logic,
however, dictates that the circumstances be explained.
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For example, the rationale for the waiver request, nature
of the requirement being procured, the unique circumstances that
preclude application of the clause, lack of alternative sources
for the requirement, and the method by which the U. S. inter-
est can be protected, even without the cost and pricing certi-
fication.
The request for waiver, if a Secretarial signature is re-
quired, will receive review prior to release at the Procuring
Activity and also at the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) level
prior to submission to the ASN (M,RA&L)
.
Waiver of Cost Accounting Standards is a more involved
process. When the contracting officer determines that it is im-
practical to obtain the requirement from any other source,
documentation is prepared which goes forward via the chain of •
command. Procuring Activity, CNM, ASN (M,RA&L) , to the Deputy
Under Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering for Ac-
quisition Policy (USD, R&E(AP)). He in turn makes a request
to the Cost Accounting Standards Board (CASE) for the waiver.
The CASE may waive any or all of the Cost Accounting Standards.
The request for waiver will describe the requirement and
contain: (1) the total amount of the proposed award, (2) a
statement that no other source is available to satisfy the
requirement, (3) a statement outlining the reasons for reject-
ing any possible alternatives for fulfilling the requirement,
(4) a statement outlining the steps being taken to establish
other sources of supply for future procurements of the require-
ment, and (5) any other pertinent information relative to the




IIn circumstances where the procurement is for the same
requirement from the same contractor and a previous waiver has
been granted by the CASE, the Secretary is delegated the author-
ity described above.
Waiver of the Examination of Records by Comptroller General
clause in contracts with foreign sources requires a determina-
tion by the Secretary with the concurrence of the Comptroller
General that the inclusion of the clause would not be in the
public interest. In cases where the contractor or subcontrac-
tor is a foreign government or an agency thereof and is pre-
cluded by the laws of the country involved from making its
books and documents available for examination, the Secretary
may make the determination alone. He must take into account
the price and availability of the requirement from U. S. sources
and determine that it is in the public interest to exclude the
clause. In the case where the Comptroller General is not re-
quired to concur, a written report is required to be submitted
explaining the determination to the Congress.
It is the policy to include this clause whenever possible
and the contracting officer is expected to make all reasonable
efforts to do so and consider such factors as alternate sources,
additional cost, and time of delivery.
The determination to support the waiver shall: (1) identi-
fy the contract or subcontractor and the parties involved, (2)
describe the efforts to have the clause included, (3) state the
reasons for the refusal to accept the clause, (4) describe al-
ternatives available, and (5) determine it is in the public
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interest to exclude the clause [16:49 6-1004].
The basis of a waiver for the Buy American Act can flow
from two sources. As mentioned, the "Culver-Nunn" amendment ^
provided the Secretary of Defense authority to waive the Act
where it was determined in the best interest of national defense
in order to procure standardized or interoperable equipment.
The DAR provides various exemptions. The Act does not ap-
ply to requirements for use outside the U.S. The Act does not
apply to (1) end products determined unavailable in sufficient
quantities and quality in the U.S., or (2) components of end
products determined unavailable in sufficient quantities and
quality. The determination of nonavailability has various
dollar threshholds. For procurements exceeding $1,000,000
the Secretary of the Department or a designee at a level no
lower than a Head of a Procuring Activity may make the deter-
mination. Such determinations should consider the feasibility
of foregoing the requirement or providing a U.S. substitute.
Other exemptions apply to Canadian Supplies, Panamanian Sup-
plies for use in the Canal Zone and a determination that domes-
tic source products would be unreasonable in cost or incon-
sistent with the public interest. There is a procedure to
evaluate bids giving preference to U.S. sources on which the
unreasonable cost determination is made. [16:6-103]
The waiver procedure is involved and potentially time-
consuming. In most situations, numerous levels of review are
required to get the ultimate determination for the waiver.
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D. MEMORANDUM OF UNIPERSTANDING
It has been noted that the memorandum of understanding
(MOU) is an agreement between governments or between a govern-
ment and an international organization and that it sets forth
the guiding principles governing the relationship of the parties
involved.
The MOU takes a variety of forms and degrees of complexity
dependent in most part on the nature of the effort involved.
For example, the format for a cooperative development program
has been rather well established. [15:47]
A second type of MOU deals with purchases to be made by
the U.S. Government from foreign firms either directly or via
the foreign government. In addition to the concerns of the
cooperative development MOU/ a direct government-to-government
MOU should reference the applicable laws and establish the
basic guidelines and procedures which will govern the direct
purchase of a foreign system by the U. S.
The important aspect of either type of MOU is that any
laws or regulations which might affect the proposed program
should be incorporated into the MOU. In this sense, MOU's
generally contain a waiver of the buy national laws of the
respective signatories.
For instance, based on an offset agreement contained in a
MOU dated 24 September 197 5 between the U.S. and the United
Kingdom, the Secretary of Defense determined that restrictions
of the Buy American Act did not apply to all items of United
38

Kingdom produced or manufactured defense equipment other than
those excluded from consideration by reason of: protecting
national security such as maintenance of the mobilization base;
legally imposed restrictions on procurement from non-national
sources.
Another example is agreement on the performance of audit
services found in another U.S./ United Kingdom MOU whereby the
British Ministry of Defense (MOD) agreed to provide audit
services for DOD activities contracting with British firms,
and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) agreed to provide
audit services for MOD procurement in the United States. Of
note, however, is the provision that the agreement does not
interfere with the audit prerogatives of the U.S. General Ac-
counting Office, and does not constitute authority to delete
the Examination of Records by Comptroller General clause .
This involvement of procurement personnel early in the
development of MOU ' s for programs is important in order to
identify potential areas of disagreement relative to the U.S.
statutorily imposed requirements of contractural actions.
Normally, a government-to-government MOU references the
applicable laws and establishes the basic guidelines and pro-
cedures which will govern the direct purchase of a foreign
system by the U.S. The actual contractual vehicle is accom-
plished by a Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) . The U.S.
initiates the action by furnishing the LOA to the foreign
government with the intended buy quantity plus desired terms
and conditions. The actual contract results when the completed
LOA is returned and accepted by the U.S.
39

Terms normally associated with U.S. contracts are included
in the LOA; prices, recommended delivery schedule, detailed item
specifications, data rights, inspection and acceptance procedures
and responsibilities, and incorporation of the MOU by reference
are examples.
If terms, such as inspection and acceptance, are already
covered by a MOU, reference to the applicable MOU normally suf-
fices in the LOA. The ability to reference an existing MOU can
facilitate the processing of a LOA extensively. Points agreed
to in the MOU are not normally reconsidered as individual LOA's
are accomplished under the MOU. Waivers and approvals incor-
porated in the MOU are not reprocessed and thereby ease some
of the administrative burden.
The next chapter will review some specific international ac-
quisitions detailing how various statutory requirements were
handled.
E. SUBCONTRACT RELATIONSHIPS
In cooperative development programs, a MOU may contain lan-
guage that requires the prime contractor to solicit foreign sub-
contractors. In the case of U.S. prime contractors, various
statutory provisions are required to be included in subcon-
tracts let by the prime contractor. Where the contractor is
dealing with foreign sources, the same problem can arise, get-
ting the foreign subcontractor to accept the U.S. provisions.
Although the prime contractor bears the brunt of the responsi-
bility for including the provisions in his contracts, the contract-
ing officer is still involved in situations where the contractor
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The Department of Defense's experience with international
programs is ever-expanding as current programs mature and new
ones come into being.
This researcher looked closely at two Navy programs. The
first is a cooperative development, the Rolling Airframe Missile
(RAM) program, currently a joint program between the U.S. and
the Federal Republic of Germany. The other involves both a
direct purchase and cooperative development program, the British-
designed Harrier (AV-8A) vertical/short takeoff and landing air-
craft and the subsequent cooperative development of air frames
and engines for the U.S. improved Harrier (AV-8B) and United
Kingdom Sea Harrier programs.
B. ROLLING AIR FRAME MISSILE PROGRAM
The RAM program involves a recently awarded contract for
full-scale engineering development of the guided missile weapon
system. It is designed to meet the requrements of the U.S.,
the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) , and Denmark for point
defense in a high threat environment.
Other members of NATO have unofficially expressed interest
in the concept. They are Belgiiim, Italy, the Netherlands and
Norway. Currently, the program is jointly funded primarily




The MOU for the Full-Scale Engineering Development Phase
of the RAM system provides that to the extent possible consis-
tent with the nature of the program and the resources available
to carry out the program, the Participating Governments will
insure that the industry of the FRG is afforded the opportunity
to share With the U.S. industry in the work to be performed during
the Full-Scale Engineering Development and Production Phases of
the program.
In compliance with this provision, the U.S. Navy has en-
couraged General Dynamics (GD) , the prime contractor for the
Full-Scale Engineering Phase of the program to solicit sources
in the FRG.
The Navy contract has specified language on this subject:
SUBCONTRACTING IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY
(a) The Contractor shall award subcontracts to industry
in the Federal Republic of Germany if it is determined
that industry in the Federal Republic of Germany is the
most competitive source considering all factors such as
the technical and management capabilities of the sources,
the schedule implications and the cost to the Program.
Notwithstanding any provision of the Subcontracts clause
to the contrary, the Contractor shall not enter into sub-
contracts with industry from the Federal Republic of Ger-
many without the prior written consent of the Contracting
Officer.
The contract further provides for incorporation of terms
and conditions of the prime contract in any potential foreign
subcontracts:
FLOW-DOWN PROVISIONS
a. The contract contemplates the exercise of the contrac-
tor's best efforts to obtain the inclusion in FRG subcon-
tract (s) of provisions of this contract required by the terms
of this contract to be so included hereinafter referred to as
flow-down provisions. In the event of refusal by a sub-




(1) shall promptly submit a written report to the Pro-
curing Contracting Officer setting forth the subcon-
tractor's reason for such refusal and other pertinent
information which may expedite disposition of the matter;
and
(2) shall not proceed with award of subcontract without
the written authorization of the Procuring Contracting
Officer.
b. Any subcontractor flow-down requirements shall be subject
to the right of the Procuring Contracting Officer, at his
own instance or upon request of the Contractor, whether to
modify or to waive in writing such flow-down requirements
whenever he determines that he is not legally compelled to main-
tain such requirements, and when the respective modifications
or waivers, in his judgment, are in the interest of the Govern-
ment.
As a result of G.D.'s discussion with German industrial
sources, the company requested relief from passing on certain
provisions to German subcontractors, two in particular: DAR
clause 7-104.41, Audit by Department of Defense, and DAR clause
7-104. 42(a), Subcontracting Cost or Pricing Data. The German
companies contacted by G.D. cited their own regulations (Verord-
nung uel er Preise bei Oef fentlichen Auftraegan, Regulations on
Pricing in Public Contracts, and the Leitsatze fur Preisermit-
tlung aufgrund von Selbstkosten, Rules for the Determination of
Cost Pricing) as more appropriate than the cited clauses.
G. D. stated that repeated attempts to persuade German
sources to accept the clauses had been unsuccessful even though
these sources had complied with the provisions in the past.
The contracting officer concluded, based on G.D.'s efforts,
that the German companies would not accept subcontracts with
the particular provisions of the DAR clauses, thereby making
compliance with the MOU requirement concerning subcontracting
in Germany very difficult.
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The contracting officer took action to request waivers to
exempt all subcontracts performed by German firms in connection
with the RAM Program from the requirements of the Audit by DOD
and Subcontracting Cost or Pricing Data clauses.
If the waivers were granted, G. D. was to be required to in-
corporate the applicable provisions of the German regulations
into its subcontracts with German industry in order for the Ger-
man Government to have access to the companies in order to audit
the subcontractor's costs.
The waivers were sent forward from the Naval Sea Systems
Command via the Chief of Naval Material (CNM) to ASN(M,RA&L).
A favorable endorsement was received at CNM but ASN(M,RA&L) did
not feel they were fully justified, noting that alternate sources
were available. The waivers were denied. G. D. was informed that
the burden rested with the firm to work out the differences with
the German subcontractors.
In the subsequent discussions with the German firms, G.D.
was provided with information that the CASE and Germany, specifi-
cally representatives of the Defense Ministry and the Industrial
Association BDI, has reached an agreement to the effect that
German contractors or subcontractors would be exempted from the
Cost Accounting Standards (CAS) requirements in the event of
military orders placed by the U.S. or its contractors. The
agreement provided that Cost Accounting Standards would be sub-
stituted by German Pricing Regulations VPOR with audits to be





G. D. and the representatives of the German subcontractors
with the aid of the German Ministry of Defense developed lan-
guage that reflected aspects of the discussions held by the CASE
and German representatives. Clauses were developed covering both
accounting principles and audit procedures. Ultimate acceptabi-
lity of the clauses required additional involvement by the Under
Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering and his counter-
part in the German Ministry of Defence.
In essence, the outcome was a compromise between the U. S.
regulations and German regulations. The clause developed for
inclusion in G.D.'s contracts with its German subcontractors
reads as follows:
Special Provisions Regarding Accounting Principles
and Auditing Procedures of FRG Subcontracts
It is the understanding between the parties that the govern-
ments of the Federal Republic of Germany and the United
States are planning to arrange for updating existing agree-
ments between the governments regarding the application of
national pricing rules and regulations and audit practices
used in acquisitions involving the two governments. Until
such time as an updated agreement is reached and implemented
by the two governments the following shall apply to this
subcontract only:
a. Accounting Principles
The Seller shall utilize the cost principles set forth
in the VO PR 3 0/53 including the Leitsatze fur Preisermit-
tlung aufgrund von Selbstkosten (LSP) (appendix to the
VO PR 30/53)
.
It is agreed, that the following costs unallowable




-losses on other contracts
-cost of organization and reorganization
-uneconomical leasing and rental cost
-product-related advertising expenses
-expenses for recreation, entertainment, and ths like
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-interest and other financial costs
-plant reconversion as agreed by Purchase Order
-uneconomical relocation.
The following costs allowable under the provisions of
VO PR 3 0/53 but unallowable under DAR Section XV will
be subject of negotiations between the parties to the
subcontracts in order to comply with DAR Section XV
unallowables:
-advertising costs (to the extent unallowable by U. S.
Statutes)
-contributions and donations
-bid and proposal (to the extent unallowable by U. S.
statutes)
-depreciation on the basis of replacement costs
-independent research and development, if applicable
(to the extent unallowable by U. S. statutes)
.
If the contractor customarily uses the replacement cost
to determine depreciation costs, the contract cost will be
computed as if depreciation had been based on the actual
acquisition cost. The invested capital on which the cal-
culation of the imputed interest is based will be adjusted
in the same manner. These adjustments may be effected in
the form of lump sum adjustments.
It is understood and agreed that application of the German
pricing regulations to U.S. contracts does not prejudice
questions concerning the rate of profit or fee to be earned
under this subcontract. It is recognized that the rate of
profit or fee or amount of profit or fee will remain subject
to the negotiations by the contract parties concerned and
that deviations from the German pricing regulations (items
of cost which are deemed unallowable under DAR) will be
taken into account in negotiating the rates of profit or
fee for this subcontract.
b. Designation of Audit Agency
With the exception of Clause B-7 , Examination of Records
by Comptroller General, the Federal Office of Military
Technology and Procurement (BWB) in the Federal Republic
of Germany has been authorized as the representative of
the U. S. Government and Buyer as set forth in B-5, Audit
by Department of Defense, and any provisions of this sub-
contract expressly or by reasonable implication contemplating
access to records of the seller, for conducting proposal
price and cost reviews, actual cost audits and audits to
determine allowability of costs in accordance with the
principles set forth in Special Provision entitled "Ac-
counting Principles" above, of Seller's contract or Selleris
subcontractors at any tier within the Federal Republic of
Germany under the RAM Contract N00024-7 9-C-4202.
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In the event the Prime Contract is modified to reflect
agreements reached between the two governments, then
the parties shall agree to enter into negotiation in good
faith to modify this purchase order.
The purpose of this example is to show that even with a
MOU designed to provide an umbrella under which the contractor
was to be able to gain access to German firms, not all facets
of the contracting process were covered. Problems that had not
appeared before did, based on a new position taken by the Ger-
man firms.
Not all areas of disagreement were solved. Certain costs
allowed under the German regulations and not allowed by DAR
Section XV are subject to negotiation with G. D. bearing the
responsibility to ensure its subcontracts with the German firms
are "most competitive considering all factors." G. D. is not
relieved of any of the DAR provisions.
The solution reached is for the instant contract only with
reference made to the fact that ultimate agreement as to how
these terms would be agreed upon would rest with a forthcoming
agreement between the governments reflected in the MOU.
The impact on the contracting officer can be seen in differ-
ent ways. The waiver process is not uncommon in totally domestic
contracts. Getting top level officials of the DOD involved in
procurement problems is also not uncommon. The unique aspects
of this type of situation are the new procedures developed and
the new precedents established in areas that previously did not
exist.
There are established procedures for handling the types
of waivers that are being requested. The effort required to
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process such waivers cannot be discounted. Extensive pre-
paration and documentation is required for each level of re-
view. It can be a time consuming process.
The contracting officer is required to work with a number
of parties, the contractor, the subcontractors and the German
Government, to accomplish his responsibilities. Efforts were
expended to analyze the German regulations to determine their
specific coverage and requirements relative to the DAR require-
ments under contention.
The international aspect of the situation has an effect
on the contracting officer dealing with foreign contractors.
A recent study identified many cultural differences that can
detract, impede and influence the negotiation process. The
study noted that the functions could best be accomplished by
individuals "who understand the language, customs and business
philosophy of each country" with whom business is conducted.
[18:46] The Government contracting officer is generally not
experienced in dealing with these new international cultural
differences.
The actual burden on the contracting officer is hard to
determine. No doubt it requires more ability to work effec-
tively with the added dimension to the procurement process.
The potential for waivers requires a flexibility already exist-
ing under current procedures . The resultant workload to pro-
cess such waivers can be difficult to include in the procure-





The AV-8A Harrier was designed and developed by the British
and has been in the U. S. Marine Corps inventory since 1971.
The issue of an improved version of the AV-8B has been studied
closely and debated. The AV-8B is an improved vectored thrust
V/STOL aircraft with twice the range and payload capability of
the current AV-8A.
In late 197 5 the United Kingdom (UK) and the U. S. signed
a new agreement to ensure continued information exchange and
close coordination on the U. S. version of theAV-8B and the
U.K. version. The two countries will ultimately determine the
degree of commonality between their aircraft when they enter
into full-scale development.
In April of 197 9 a MOU between the U.K. and the U. S. was
signed relating to the AV-8B Full-Scale Development. Both
countries are still discussing to what extent the program will
actually go ahead, production decisions having not yet been
made.
Under the MOU with the U.K., Letters of Offer and Accept-
ance (LOA) are utilized to accomplish specific procurement
actions and are considered contracts between the U.S. and the
U.K. The LOA's have required waivers and deviations to existing
DAR provisions. Further, they have required the U.K. to agree
to accept certain DAR provisions which could not be waived.
The principal issue put forth in the negotiations by the
U.K. has been the question of when one government contracts
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with its own industry on behalf of another government whose
procurement practices and policies will be followed. The U.S.,
when it contracts on behalf of another government, follows
established U.S. procurement policies and procedures and does
not deviate from them to accommodate the foreign government.
The U.K.'s argument against following U.S. procedures has
fallen into two categories. The first is that as a sovereign
government providing service for another government, they ought
not to be required to follow the laws and regulations of that
other government in providing the service of contracting. The
second is that it is inefficient to follow one set of policies
and procedures when contracting with its industry on its own
behalf and to follow another set of policies and procedures
when contracting on behalf of another government. There is
some merit to these arguments.
The U. S. has countered basically with the statement that
if the U.K. doesn't agree to the provisions, U. S. appropriated
dollars would not be spent in the U.K.
As in most negotiations, a compromise is reached. Although
not normally part of their procurement policies and procedures,
the U. K. has reluctantly agreed to follow certain DAR provisions.
These DAR provisions are based on statutes without waiver
possibility or which are extremely sensitive from a public opinion
point of view so that the U.S. chooses not to waive them. For
example, DAR 17-205.11, Entertainment.
The provisions accepted by the U.K. are as follows:




41 U.S.C. 22 Officials not be Benefitted
DAR 7-103.19
10 U.S.C. 2207 Gratutities
DAR 7-104.16
P.L. 91-441 R&D and Bid and Proposal
DAR 15-205.35, Costs
15-205.3
DAR 15-2 05.8 Donations
DAR 15-205.11 Entertainment
DAR 15-2 05.1 Product Advertising
DAR 7-103.15 Rhodesia and Certain
Communist Areas
The U. S. on their part agreed to waive certain DAR provis-
ions in order to accommodate the U.K. in their desire that
they follow their own procurement policies and procedures to
the maximum extent practicable.
The following DAR provisions were waited by the U.S.:
10 U.S.C. 2313(c) Examination of Records by
DAR 7-104.15 the Comptroller General
10 U.S.C. 2313 Cost or Pricing Data and
DAR 3-8 07.3, Certificate of Current Cost
3-807.4 or Pricing
Waiver and deviation from the above requirements are sought
on an individual LOA basis. The Examination of Records clause
waiver has been based on the fact that both the Pegasus engine
and AV-8A Harrier airframe were designed, developed and pro-
duced by U.K. firms to Royal Airforce specifications. No al-
ternatives are currently available and as such the MOD is the only
entity presently capable of providing the manufacturing and
support necessary for the procurement of the airframe and engine.
The MOD has steadfastly and consistently refused to accept the
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clause providing access by another sovereign government to
records of British firms. It was determined based on the fore-
going that it would fee in the public interest to waive the
clause. The ASN (M,RA.&L) signed the waiver.
It should be noted that the MOU has language in it rela-
tive to British cost procedures. This is an outgrowth of dis-
cussions held between the CASB and MOD. It was determined that
the U.K.'s normal procedures for the purpose of negotiating
prices or verifying claims was sufficient to establish cost pro-
jections for future requirements. Further, that the MOD would
endeavor to provide access by the U.S. when requested to con-
tractor's cost and pricing data necessary to substantiate speci-
fic proposals and -to validate claims of cost incurred.
The rationale for waiving the requirement for cost and
pricing data is much the same as that for Examination of Re-
cords. Specific mention is made that the U.K. will use its
normal contracting procedures. These procedures do not involve
submission and certification of cost and pricing data to the
degree required under the U. S. procedures. The U.K. procedures
do preclude excessive contractor profits and, as such, will be
followed. Again the language in the MOU is germane.
Thus, although both these clauses were waived, the U.S.
does have certain assurances and rights as provided for in the
MOU. Combined with the statutory provisions the U.K. has
agreed to, U. S. interests are protected.
The Harrier program has considerable history as far as
international programs are concerned and for this reason most
of the unique problems have been already met. Precedents have
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been established, the routine for processing waivers estab-
lished. The requirement for adequate planning has been rather
well defined based on previous experience.
Time was spent establishing which provisions would be ac-
cepted by the U.K. For example, a waiver was requested for
DAR 15-205.11, Entertainment. The request proceeded all the
way to what was then called the Armed Services Procurement
Regulation (ASPR) Committee. Upon consideration, the Under
Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering for Acquisition
Policy, had the request withdrawn. He did not want the precedent
established and, further, was concerned about the potential for
adverse public opinion.
The contracting officer informed his counterpart in the MOD
that he had exhausted his available remedies to have the clause
waived. The MOD verified this with the USD, R&E(AP) and sub-
sequently accepted the clause. The issue has not come up again.
It is not intended to convey that the procurement process
in this international program is totally without burden. The
additional effort is real. Contracting officers do change and
there is sometimes limited corporate memory. Dealing with cul-
tural differences must be learned and mostly by first hand
experience.
The Harrier Program has been unique, sharing with one or
two other Navy programs a history of experience on which better
preparation for specific contracts can be based.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. There are alternatives to the contractual statutory
provisions. It is recognized that foreign parties are often
reluctant to accept many U.S. imposed provisions in their con-
tracts. Although certain statutory requirements have no waiver
potential by DOD, with Congressional action being the only al-
ternative, there are are statutory provisions that do have
waiver possibilities. The criteria for a determination varies.
It is not an automatic process of requesting and subsequently
granting the waiver request. Some waivers can be granted at a
relatively low command level, others involve numerous command
approvals prior to the ultimate determination. It can be a
lengthy and tedious process.
The justification and criteria for waivers is not always
that clear. The contracting officer, depending on his previous
experience, is required to learn by doing. Criticism that re-
sults in resubmittal of a waiver request to the various approval
levels is not only an administrative burden to all involved, but
also is time consuming and can raise havoc with procurement
planning.
This learning by doing is one of the key factors in current
international acquisition programs. Contracting officers are, as
a program matures, developing a rapport with the foreign parties
with which they are dealing on a particular program. Almost on
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a trial and error basis each party learns the ground rules
and the limitations of the other party involved.
Even in the situations where the provisions are non-
waivable, frequently language can be developed agreeable to
both parties that in essence spells out a procedure that ac-
complishes the intent of the provision without requiring the
specific action required by the original provision.
2. Memoranda of Understanding are important agreements.
They are designed to set forth the guiding principles govern-
ing the relationship of the parties to the agreement. Their
effectiveness in the contracting process can partly be meas-
ured by the extent to which the agreement covers the partici-
pants' specific laws and regulations that affect acquisitions
accomplished under the MOU.
3. Contracting procedures differ from country to country.
Difficulties arise in assessing how to get the same level of
confidence with various sets of contracting procedures. The
recent agreements reached by the CASE and other governments
relative to the particular country's contracting methods have
been helpful. These agreements have not covered the entire




Differences of interpretation may occur as different
United States agencies deal with a particular foreign country
or firm. Without some type of central coordination, the op-
portunity exists to get inconsistent positions relative to
waiving of particular statutes. Although the facts of a parti-
cular action must support each individual waiver, the importance
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of maintaining a consistent approach .with respect to each
foreign party cannot be stressed enoTjgh.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. One primary source of information should be available
so that both U.S. contracting personnel and foreign parties
would have a reference or framework of statutory provisions
that may affect an international acquisition. The unwaivable
statutory provisions would be listed. Potentially waivable
provisions would also be listed. The criteria for waivers
should be provided so that the requesting parties understand
the type of justification required to support a waiver request.
Justifications should provide alternative procedures to gain,
to the extent possible, the same level of confidence as en-
visioned by the original statutory provision. U. S. contract-
ing officers should insure that alternate sources for the re-
quirement have been explored, sources that would accept the
statutory provision.
I would suggest that this information be included in a
change to DAR Section VI or as an appendix to the Section, in
the same manner that Appendix O currently is structured for
Cost Accounting Standards. The responsibility for this change
should rest with the Office on International Acquisition which
was recently established on the staff of the Under Secretary of
Defense, Research and Engineering for Acquisition Policy.
2. Waivers should be included in the MOU's developed be-
tween the governments. The waivers and supporting justifications
would be approved on a one-time basis within the scope of the MOU.
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Subsequent contracts placed under the MOU would not require
individual waivers, for example, as is the case with the AV-8B
Full-Scale Development MOU. This recommendation would require
early involvement of the contracting officer on the MOU negoti-
ation team. The justification issues would be addressed at
this point in time. Coordination to insure more consistency
would be provided by the Office on International Acquisition.
They would be charged with implementation of such a require-
ment by changes to current directives, DODD 5530.3, Inter-
national Agreements, or by issuance of a policy memorandum.
Both of these recommendations would reduce the impact on
the contracting officer of the difficult and time consuming
waiver process. It would not relieve the requirement for
waivers in all circumstances, but would reduce some of the
administrative workload. Foreign parties would be put in a
better position to understand the U. S. requirements for enter
ing into a contract with more of a potential for concentrating
on the central issues of the instant contract and not the
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